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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-JUVENILES-STATE LAW AU-
THORIZING PRETRIAL DETENTION OF JUVENILES UPON A 
FINDING OF RISK OF FUTURE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR UP-
HELD AS VALID UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. Schall v. 
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). 
Three juveniles, detained before trial pursuant to section 320.5(3)(b) 
of the New York Family Court Act,1 instituted a habeas corpus class 
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act violated the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 After a full trial on the 
merits, the district court declared the statute unconstitutional. 3 The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.4 The United States 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 320.5(3)(b) does not violate 
due process because preventive detention serves a legitimate state interest 
sufficient to justify abridgment of the detained juvenile's liberty interest. 5 
The Court also held that the Act contains adequate procedural safe-
guards to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary impairment of constitution-
ally protected rights.6 
The constitutional rights of juveniles have developed within the 
framework of a court system separate from that dealing with adults. 7 At 
1. New York Family Court Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 320.5(3)(b) (1983). Section 
320.5(3)(b) provides: 
ld. 
The Court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts and 
reasons for so finding that unless the respondent is detained; 
(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on 
the return date; or 
(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date commit an 
act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime. 
2. United States ex rei. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. N.Y. 1981), affd, 
689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 
(1984). The juveniles also alleged that the statute violated equal protection because 
it applied only to juveniles and not to adults. The district court dismissed this 
claim, holding that the states do have a right to differentiate between adults and 
juveniles. ld. at 706. 
3. United States ex rei. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 
affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 
(1984). The district court held that the statute violated due process because: (1) it 
gives the judge a license to act arbitrarily in predicting the likelihood of future crim-
inal conduct; (2) pretrial detention without a prior adjudication or probable cause is 
per se unconstitutional; and, (3) pretrial detention constitutes punishment that is 
constitutionally prohibited under the due process clause. ld. at 707. 
4. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 
104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). The court of appeals found that most juveniles considered 
sufficiently dangerous by the family court to justify pretrial detention are actually 
released within days or weeks. ld. at 369. Thus, the court concluded that the vast 
majority of pretrial detention involves either mistakes in judgment fostered by the 
procedurally and substantively unlimited terms of section 320.5(3), or imposition of 
incarceration solely as punishment for unadjudicated crimes. ld. at 373. 
5. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2406 (1984). 
6. ld. at 2417. 
7. Comment, The Supreme Court and Pretrial Detention 0/ Juveniles: A Principled 
Solution to a Due Process Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 98 (1983). 
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the inception of the juvenile court system,8 wide differences were toler-
ated between the procedural rights given to adults and those given to 
children.9 Treatment and rehabilitation, rather than punishment, formed 
the goals of the juvenile court movement. \0 It was believed that these 
goals could best be achieved by relaxing strict rules of evidence and pro-
cedure and allowing the "fatherly" family court judge broad discretion in 
determining each child's needs. II 
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has recognized a gap 
between the originally benign ideals of the juvenile court system and its 
realities. 12 The Court has noted, "there is evidence, in fact, that there 
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both 
worlds: that he gets neither the protection accorded to adults nor the 
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."13 
Thus, the Court has held that certain basic constitutional protections en-
joyed by adults accused of a crime must also be made available to 
juveniles involved in delinquency proceedings. 14 Furthermore, the Court 
has held that delinquency proceedings must also comply with the "fun-
damental fairness" requirement of due process. IS Only where a due pro-
cess right might destroy the traditional character of juvenile proceedings 
and where other available procedural rights will give the juvenile suffi-
cient protections, has the Court refused to extend adult due process pro-
tections to the juvenile system. 16 
Although the Court had sketched the constitutional framework of 
juvenile adjudicatory rights prior to Schall v. Martin,17 it had never con-
fronted issues concerning juvenile preadjudicatory rights. 18 The Court 
also had never ruled on the constitutionality of detaining any individual, 
adult or juvenile, for the purpose of preventing future crime. 19 The tradi-
tional justification for pretrial detention has been the state's interest in 
8. The first American juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899. 
For a discussion of the development of the juvenile court system, see generally S. 
DAVIS, THE RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 1 (1974). 
9. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1966). 
10. Id. at 15-16. 
11. S. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 3. 
12. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975). 
13. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
14. E.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (notice 
of charges; right to counsel; privilege against self-incrimination; right to confronta-
tion and cross-examination). 
15. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 
528, 543 (1971). 
16. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (no right to jury trial in 
juvenile proceeding because a full adversary process might end the idealistic concept 
of an informal, protective proceeding). 
17. 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). 
18. Comment, supra note 7, at 100. 
19. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2410 (1984). 
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ensuring the presence of the accused at trial,20 and the Court has held 
that detention for this limited purpose is not a violation of due process.21 
In Bell v. Wolfish,22 however, the Court specifically left open whether any 
governmental interest other than ensuring a detainee's presence at trial 
may constitutionally justify pretrial detention.23 Although only the Dis-
trict of Columbia permits pretrial detention of adults for the purpose of 
preventing harm to the community,24 several states allow detention of 
juveniles accused of committing a crime for reasons other than ensuring 
their presence at trial, such as protecting the community and the juvenile 
from the possibility of future criminal conduct.25 At least eight state 
courts have upheld the constitutionality of juvenile preventive detention 
statutes.26 
The mere invocation of a legitimate state interest, however, will not 
justify restrictions and conditions of pretrial detention that amount to 
punishment. 27 Due process also requires that a person not be punished 
prior to a finding of guilt. 28 Therefore, it is necessary to determine 
whether detention has been instituted for a punitive purpose. This deter-
mination generally depends upon whether there is any alternative pur-
pose to which the restriction rationally may be connected, and whether 
the restriction appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as-
signed.29 The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has applied 
20. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 
VA. L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1970). 
21. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420. U.S. 103, 
114 (1975) (government may lawfully detain a suspect prior to a determination of 
guilt); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (right to release before trial is condi-
tioned upon adequate assurance of presence at trial and submission to sentence if 
found guilty). 
22. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
23. Id. at 534 n.15. 
24. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to 1322 (1981 & Supp. 1983). The Court of Appeals 
of the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of this statute in United 
States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 
(1982). 
25. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-59(a)(I)-(4) (1975); DEL. FAM. Cr. R. 60; ILL. REV. 
STAT. ch. 37, §§ 703-4 (1983-84 Supp.); MD. Crs. & IUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
815(b) (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6325 (1982); VA. CODE § 16.1-248 
(1982); see also Comment, A Due Process Dilemma: Pretrial Detention in Juvenile 
Delinquency Proceedings, 11 I. MAR. I. PRAC. & PROC. 513, 518-25 (1978) (contain-
ing a thorough review of the preventive detention statutes in all fifty states). 
26. Aubrey v. Gadbois, 50 Cal. App. 3d 470, 123 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975); L.O.W. v. 
District Court of Arapahoe, 623 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1981); Pauley v. Gross, 1 Kan. 
App. 2d 736, 574 P.2d 234 (1977); Baker v. Smith, 477 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1971); 
State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573 (Me. 1979); People ex reI. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 
N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976); Commonwealth ex reI. 
Sprawal v. Hendrick, 438 Pa. 435, 265 A.2d 348 (1970); Morris v. D'Amario, 416 
A.2d 137 (R.I. 1980). 
27. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2412 (1984). 
28. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). 
29. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Although other crite-
rion for determining whether a restraint constitutes punishment were also men-
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this test to its adult preventive detention statute and has held that the 
intent of the legislature to protect the community is a valid "alternative 
purpose" sufficient to qualify the statute as regulatory rather than pe-
nal. 30 The Schall decision, however, was the first Supreme Court holding 
authorizing pretrial detention to protect the community and the juvenile. 
Even if there is no punitive purpose behind preventive detention, the 
denial of individual liberty still requires compliance with the mandates of 
procedural due process. 31 In determining the scope of procedural protec-
tions required by the due process clause, the Supreme Court in Mathews 
v. Eldridge 32 developed a test requiring a balancing of three factors: the 
private interests affected by a proceeding, the countervailing governmen-
tal interests involved, and the risk that the procedures chosen will lead to 
an erroneous decision. 33 
The private interests implicated when an individual is faced with 
incarceration are obvious. The Supreme Court has recognized in the 
adult context the "serious impact on the individual" that pretrial deten-
tion entails: the disruption of personal and professional life, the subjec-
tion to stark conditions of the person detained, and the serious 
consequences of confinement on trial preparation.34 The Court has im-
plied that the private interests at stake in juvenile proceedings are compa-
rable to those at stake in adult criminal prosecutions. 35 In addition, 
numerous courts36 and commentators37 have recognized the specific det-
riment to which a detained juvenile may be subjected. No matter how 
tioned in Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court in Schall focused on "alternative 
purpose." Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2413 (1984). 
30. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1331-32 (D.C. 1981) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of the District of Columbia's preventive detention statute), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in relevant part: "nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
32. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
33. Id. at 335; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (applying Eldridge 
test); Lassiter v. Department of Social Service, 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981) (same). 
34. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972). 
35. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) (In terms of potential conse-
quences, there is little to distinguish a juvenile adjudicatory hearing with a tradi-
tional criminal prosecution); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) (the same 
considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent 
adult apply as well to the innocent child); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (a 
proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found "delinquent" and 
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony 
prosecution). 
36. See, e.g., Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[p]retrial detention 
is an onerous experience, especially for juveniles"); Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347, 
1359 (6th Cir. 1974) ("courts also particularly take judicial notice that it is not 
uncommon to find the indiscriminate mixing of hardened criminals, including sex-
ual assaulters, with young offenders"); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 
346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (D.R.1. 1972) ("[i]nstead of mother and father and sisters 
and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, 
state employees and delinquents confined with him"); In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 
16,31 n.25, 473 P.2d 737,747 n.25, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33,43 n.25 (1970) ("[it] is difficult 
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brief, pretrial detention has an adverse impact on a child's schooling and 
work opportunities.38 Furthermore, because children are often more vul-
nerable and impressionable than adults,39 incarceration may actually be a 
tnore devastating experience for a child than it would be for an adult. 40 
Thus, whether a potential detainee is a juvenile or an adult, the interest 
in remaining free from institutional restraint is substantia1.41 
An individual's interest in pretrial liberty must be weighed against 
the countervailing governmental interests in pretrial detention. The gov-
ernmental interests asserted as justification for pretrial detention are the 
protection of the community and the juvenile from the possibility of fu-
ture criminal conduct by the juvenile.42 The interest in preventing future 
crime is of great importance and the Supreme Court has stressed that 
crime prevention is a "weighty social objective."43 The state's interest in 
guarding against future crime, however, is valid only to the extent that 
pretrial detention actually prevents the commission of a crime.44 
The difficulty in predicting whether a juvenile will commit a crime if 
not detained requires consideration of the third factor of the Eldridge 
test: the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous and unneces-
sary deprivation of liberty. Several commentators believe that there is an 
inherent risk of error in detention decisions that call for predictions of 
future criminal conduct because there are no diagnostic tools available 
that would enable even the most highly trained criminologists to predict 
which individuals will engage in future crime.45 The Supreme Court, 
however, has rejected the contention that procedures calling for predic-
for an adult who has not been through the experience to realize the terror that 
engulfs a youngster the first time he loses his liberty."). 
37. Eg., R. SARRI, UNDER LOCK AND KEY: JUVENILES IN JAILS AND DETENTION 
(1974); Aubry, The Nature, Scope and Significance of Pre-Trial Detention of 
Juveniles in California, 1 BLACK L.J. 160, 164 (1971); Komisaruk, Psychiatric Issues 
in the Incarceration of Juveniles, 21 Juv. Cr. JUDGES J. 117 (1971). 
38. See Brief for Appellee at 55, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). 
39. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.1I (1982). 
40. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2424 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,27 (1967) ("The fact of the matter is that, however euphe-
mistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institu-
tion of confinement. . . . "). 
42. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Prior to Schall, the Supreme Court had 
never ruled on whether any governmental objective other than ensuring the de-
tainee's presence at trial could constitutionally justify pretrial detention. Schall v. 
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2410 (1984); see also supra notes 18-22 and accompanying 
text. . 
43. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). 
44. See Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring) 
(pretrial detention does not further crime prevention if the prediction of further 
criminal behavior is highly uncertain), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 
2403 (1984). 
45. E.g., Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: 
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1094-1101 (1976); Dia-
mond, The Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 440 
(1974); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping 
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 696 (1974); Ervin, Preventive Deten-
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tions of future criminality are inherently unsound.46 The Court has held 
that such predictive judgments invariably become an important element 
in many decisions affecting liberty interests,47 and, therefore, the diffi-
culty of such determinations does not mean that they cannot be made.48 
In Schall v. Martin,49 the Supreme Court decided for the first time 
whether pretrial detention of juveniles for the purpose of preventing fu-
ture crime is compatible with the "fundamental fairness" required by due 
process. 50 The Court noted that to answer this question two separate 
inquiries were necessary: first, whether preventive detention serves a le-
gitimate state interest; and, second, whether there are adequate proce-
dural safeguards available to authorize detaining an individual. 51 
Answering the first inquiry, the Schall Court noted that there is a 
legitimate and compelling state interest in protecting the community 
from crime. 52 Furthermore, society has an interest in protecting a juve-
nile from the consequences of his criminal conduct. 53 In recognizing the 
legitimacy of the state's interest in preventive detention, the Court found 
significant the widespread use, and judicial acceptance among the states, 
of preventive detention of juveniles. 54 Although the Court acknowledged 
that juveniles have a countervailing interest in remaining free from insti-
tutional restraint, it reasoned that this interest is lessened because 
juveniles are "always in some form of custody."55 Children are assumed 
to be subject to the control of their parents, or of the state if parental 
tion: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 378 (1970); Tribe, 
supra note 20, at 378. 
46. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-75 (1976). 
47. E.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (segregation of a prisoner); Connecticut 
Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) (commutation of a sentence); 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 
(1979) (grant or denial of parole); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (imposition of 
the death penalty); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole). 
48. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976). 
49. 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). 
50. Id. at 2409. 
51. Id. The Court noted that in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15 (1979), it had 
specifically left open whether any governmental objective other than ensuring a de-
tainee's presence at trial could constitutionally justify pretrial detention. Schall v. 
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2410 (1984). 
52. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2410 (citing DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)). 
De Veau involved a challenge to a state statute that disqualified from office any per-
son convicted of a felony. The Court held that the challenged state legislation was 
part of a program to vindicate a legitimate and compelling state interest in combat-
ting local crime infesting a particular industry. DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 155. 
53. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2411 (childhood "is a time and condition of life when a person 
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage") (quoting Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). 
54. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2411. The Court noted that all states and the District of Co-
lumbia have statutes authorizing preventive detention of juveniles and that eight 
states have upheld the constitutionality of their statutes with specific reference to 
protecting the juvenile and the community from pretrial crime. Id.; see supra notes 
24-25 and accompanying text. 
55. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2410. 
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control falters. 56 Thus, the Court characterized detention as merely a 
transfer of custody from the parent to the state, and held that, in appro-
priate circumstances, the juvenile's liberty interest may be subordinate to 
the state's parens patriae interest in preserving the welfare of the child. 57 
The Court concluded that preventive detention of juveniles serves a legit-
imate regulatory purpose compatible with due process. 58 
After weighing the private and state interests involved in pretrial 
detention, the Court noted the due process requirement that punishment 
not be imposed prior to an adjudication of guilt. 59 Thus, the Schall 
Court found it necessary to decide whether pretrial detention is instituted 
for the purpose of punishment, or whether it serves some other "alterna-
tive purpose."60 Applying this test to the New York preventive detention 
statute, the Court first found that the limited time frames61 and condi-
tions62 of confinement reflected a regulatory purpose for detention rather 
than a punitive purpose.63 The Court also rejected the contention that, 
because the vast majority of juveniles detained either have their petitions 
dismissed before adjudication or are released immediately following adju-
dication, the underlying purpose of the statute is punitive.64 The Court 
reasoned that a delinquency petition can be dismissed for numerous rea-
sons collateral to the merits of the case, such as the failure of a witness to 
testify, and, therefore, the final disposition of a case is "largely irrele-
vant" to the legality of the pretrial detention.65 
The majority applied the third factor of the Eldridge 66 test to an-
swer whether the procedures of New York's preventive detention statute 
provide sufficient protection against erroneous and unnecessary depriva-
tion of liberty.67 The Court first noted that the Act entitles a juvenile to 
56.Id. 
57.Id. 
58. Id. at 2412. 
59. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979». 
60. Id. at 2413 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963». 
61. Id. Detention pursuant to the Act is strictly limited in time. A juvenile accused of 
committing a serious crime can be detained no longer than seventeen days prior to a 
fact-finding hearing. A juvenile accused of committing a less serious crime can be 
detained no longer than six days. New York Family Court Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW 
§ 340.1 (1983). 
62. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2413. Nonsecure detention involves an open facility in the 
community without locks, bars, or security officers. Secure detention is more restric-
tive, but children are still assigned to separate dorms based on age, size, and behav-
ior, and they are provided with educational and recreational programs. Id. A 
juvenile cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, be sent to a prison where he 
would be exposed to adult criminals. New York Family Court Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW 
§ 304.1 (2) (1983). 
63. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2414. 
64.Id. 
65. Id. at 2415. 
66. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For a discussion of the Eldridge 
test see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
67. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2415 (1984). 
386 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
a formal probable cause hearing within three days of detention.68 The 
juveniles who had been detained, however, claimed that detention deci-
sions are intrinsically arbitrary because the statute contains no objective 
criteria to guide the judge in deciding who should be detained.69 The 
Court rejected this claim by holding that the right to a hearing, to coun-
sel and to a statement of facts, make it unnecessary to list in a statute 
specific factors that a judge must follow in the detention decision.70 The 
Court found no reason for a federal court to assume that a state judge 
would not apply state law as conscientiously as possible.71 The Schall 
Court further reasoned that because the family court must exercise a sub-
stitute parental function, a juvenile detention statute should not contain 
any particularized criteria. 72 
The detained juveniles also claimed that pretrial detention decisions 
are inherently arbitrary because they are based on a prediction of future 
crime, a prediction that is virtually impossible to make accurately.73 The 
Schall Court, reaffirming earlier decisions,74 held that a prediction of fu-
ture criminal conduct can be made accurately.75 The Court stated that 
such a prediction is an experienced one based upon a number of variables 
that cannot be easily codified. Furthermore, there are adequate post-de-
tention procedures, such as habeas corpus review, appeals, and motions 
for reconsideration, that provide a sufficient mechanism for correcting 
any erroneous detention on a case by case basis.76 
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Marshall found persuasive the 
findings of the lower court77 that the vast majority of juveniles detained 
under the Act are released prior to or immediately following adjudica-
tion.78 These findings indicate that most juvenile detainees, when ex-
amined more carefully than at their initial appearance, are deemed 
insufficiently dangerous to warrant further incarceration.79 The dissent 
stated that this situation seems to undercut the governmental purpose 
68. Id. at 2416; see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (a judicial determination 
of probable cause is a prerequisite to any extended restraint of an adult accused of a 
crime). The Gerstein Court did not, however, mandate a specific timetable of what 
was to be considered "extended restraint" or how soon after detention a probable 
cause hearing was to be held. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2415. 
69. See Brief for Appellee at 64-65, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984) (the serious-
ness of the crime, the nature of the proof, and the necessary degree of probability are 
all relegated to the discretion of the family court judge). 
70. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2418. 
71. Id. 
72.Id. 
73. Id. at 2417; see supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
74. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
75. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2417. 
76. Id. at 2418 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979». 
77. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365,369 (2d Cir. 1982) (affg 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.~. 
N.Y. 181), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). 
78. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2420-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
79. /d. at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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assigned to the statute by the majority, because the state's interest in 
preserving the welfare of the child and protecting the community is in-
sufficient where the juvenile, if freed, would probably not have commit-
ted a crime. 80 
Justice Marshall also disagreed with the majority's finding that the 
statute provides adequate procedural guidelines to guard against errone-
ous deprivation of liberty.81 He noted that the statute is not limited to 
classes of juveniles whose past conduct suggests that they are substan-
tially more likely than the average person to commit a future crime. Fur-
thermore, the statute permits detention of juveniles who have been 
arrested for even trivial offenses and who have no prior record.82 The 
high rate of error in these detention decisions is reflected by comparing 
the number of juveniles held pretrial to the number ultimately incarcer-
ated following adjudication. 83 Thus, the dissent concluded that the net 
effect of the statute is overwhelmingly detrimental, and that none of the 
asserted governmental interests sufficiently outweighs the harmful effect 
of the Act on the juveniles who come within its purview.84 
Despite contrary precedent,85 the Schall decision indicates that the 
liberty interests of juveniles are less vital than those of adults. Although 
the Court has held in In re Gault 86 and In re Winship 87 that delinquency 
proceedings must comport with the fundamental fairness required by the 
fourteenth amendment, its decision in Schall indicates weakened support 
for juvenile rights. In upholding a statutory scheme that is so clearly 
violative of due process,88 the Court indicates its willingness to deal with 
juveniles outside established principles of law applicable to adult 
offenders. 
As the dissent noted, "if the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process 
Clause means anything, it means freedom from institutional restraint."89 
The Schall majority down played the importance of this principle by dis-
counting the impact of incarceration on juveniles. The Court implied 
80. [d. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
81. [d. at 2427-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
82. [d. at 2430 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In contrast to the Family Court Act, the 
District of Columbia's adult detention statute, which was upheld in United States v. 
Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982), au-
thorizes detention only if the person is charged with one of a prescribed set of dan-
gerous crimes and only if the judge finds there is a substantial probability that the 
defendant committed the crime. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2)(c) (1981). 
83. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The vast majority of persons 
detained under the Family Court Act are released either before or immediately fol~ 
lowing their trials. [d. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
84. [d. at 2433 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
85. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
86. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
87. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
88. One commentator alleges that the constitutional arguments against preventive de-
tention are so numerous that "their recitation looks like the model answer to an 
issue-spotting question on a law school examination." Ervin, supra note 25, at 297. 
89. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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that because juveniles are subject to parental control, their liberty inter-
ests are less important than those of an adult.90 There is, however, a 
significant difference between parental control and imprisonment. In at-
tempting to analogize the two, the majority disregards the realities of 
juvenile detention.91 
The Schall Court would have better served both society and the ju-
venile justice system had it declared the New York preventive detention 
statute unconstitutional. Such a holding would have provided the legis-
lature with an opportunity to reevaluate the entire process surrounding 
detention. Possibly, the legislature then could have developed detention 
procedures that were less arbitrarily applied and that offered some degree 
of respect for the due process rights of juveniles. For example, pretrial 
detention could have been limited to apply only to juveniles charged with 
one of a prescribed set of violent crimes and, even then, only if a judge 
found that there was probable cause to believe that the individual com-
mitted the crime. The statute could have been further limited to apply 
only to juveniles with a past record of criminal behavior or whose past 
conduct suggested that they were substantially more likely than the aver-
age person to commit a crime prior to trial. These objective criteria 
would have served as a guide to family court judges in deciding whether 
to detain and would have reduced the unbridled discretion that is permit-
ted under the current preventive detention statute. However, the 
Supreme Court chose to allow the practice of discretionary detention of 
juveniles to continue. By so choosing, the Court disregards the wide-
spread agreement that too many juveniles are unnecessarily and inappro-
priately detained throughout the United States.92 Current detention 
practices have done much to undermine the credibility of the juvenile 
court system. Preventive detention imposes incarceration without a find-
ing of guilt, thereby undermining the presumption of innocence. Such a 
practice downgrades the importance of an individual's right to be free 
from arbitrary and unnecessary confinement, and is at odds with our so-
ciety's value system which places such high regard on freedom. 
Kim Detrick 
90. Id. at 2410. 
91. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
92. See Amicus Brief, Youth Law Center and the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, 
at 6, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). 
